Scope of Discovery Against the United States by Asbill, Mac & Snell, Willis B.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 7 
Issue 4 Issue 4 - A Symposium on Federal 
Jurisdiction and Procedure 
Article 9 
6-1954 
Scope of Discovery Against the United States 
Mac Asbill 
Willis B. Snell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mac Asbill and Willis B. Snell, Scope of Discovery Against the United States, 7 Vanderbilt Law Review 582 
(1954) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol7/iss4/9 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more 
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
SCOPE OF DISCOVERY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
MAC ASBILL* AND WILLIS B. SNELLt
In the interpretation and application of the discovery provisions
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,1 one of the most controversial
problems is the extent to which discovery is available against the
United States when it is a party to an action. Undeniably, the
Government is entitled to use the discovery procedures, and it has
not hesitated to do so; however, it has often fought vigorously the
use of the same procedures against it.2 At one time the Government
argued unsuccessfully that it was entirely exempt from the discovery
provisions of the Rules. It has apparently abandoned this argument,
but it continues to fight discovery by urging not only its well-recog-
nized evidentiary privileges, but also an all inclusive privilege which,
it contends, executive officers alone can apply. In answer to claims
of this latter privilege, the courts have gone in all directions, often
assuming or inventing such a privilege, and sometimes even apply-
ing it, but more frequently finding a way to avoid it.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the unique problems arising
as to discovery against the United States as a party litigant. The
discussion does not cover the situation where discovery is sought
against the United States although it is not a party.4 Nor does it
* Member, firm of Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Washington, D. C. Mem-
ber of District of Columbia and Georgia bars.
t Associate, firm of Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Washington, D. C. Mem-
ber of District of Columbia bar.
1. F~m. R. Civ. P. 26-37. Rules 26 to 32 provide for taking depositions, both
upon oral examination and upon written interrogatories, before and after
an action is commenced. Rule 33 provides for written interrogatories to parties,
Rule 34 for production of documents for inspection and copying, Rule 35 for
physical and mental examination of persons and Rule 36 for admission of
facts and of genuineness of documents. Rule 37 provides sanctions for refusal
to make discovery.
Substantially the same problems are presented under Admiralty Rule
31, as to interrogatories, and Rule 32, as to production of documents. The
following discussion relates to these rules as well, and some of the cases
cited arose under them.
2. For a statement as to the Government's reluctance to submit to dis-
covery in antitrust cases, see Yankwich, "Observations on Anti-Trust Pro-
cedures," 10 F.R.D. 165, 168 (1951).
3. Included are suits brought in the name of a Government official, such
as those to enjoin violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act., e.g., Walling
v. Comet Carriers, Inc., 3 F.R.D. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Walling v. Richmond
Screw Anchor Co., 4 F.R.D. 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1943); or the Price Control Act,
e.g., Bowles v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). A suit against a
Collector of Internal Revenue has also been considered to be against the
United States for this purpose. Brewer v. Hassett, 2 F.R.D. 222 (D. Mass.
1942). For a borderline case, see Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 74 F. Supp. 933
(D. Hawaii 1947), where the court in effect treated a suit for wrongful im-
prisonment against government officials as an action against the United
States because plaintiff alleged "federally protected rights" and because
attorneys from the Department of Justice appeared for the defendants.
4. The leading cases on this subject are: United States ex rel. Touhy v.
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cover the usual problems which are presented in seeking discovery
against any private litigant and which are, of course, also present
when the United States is involved.5 The subject to be discussed
can be divided into three parts: (1) whether the United States is
subject to discovery; (2) whether there are any special privileges
available to it which are not available to an ordinary litigant; and (3)
to the extent that there are such special privileges, who decides
their application.
I. APPLICABILITy OF DiscovERY PROCEDURES TO THE UITED STATES
A discussion of the Government's argument that it is exempt
from discovery appears in only one reported case.6 The Government
there argued (1) that since discovery replaces the old bill for dis-
covery in equity which was a separate action that could be brought
against the sovereign only with its independent consent, independent
consent still is necessary for the present method of discovery; and
(2) that since the discovery provisions do not mention the United
States, they do not apply to it, because a law does not bind the
sovereign unless it specifically so states.
Both arguments are fallacious. The first overlooks the change
made by the Federal Rules; the method of discovery is a matter of
procedure, and a party litigant is subject to the procedures and rules
of the court at the time of the action, not to the procedures and rules
as they existed sometime in the past. Just as the need for a separate
action for discovery is abolished, so the need for separate consent by
the sovereign is abolished. The second argument applies a general
rule of construction to a situation in which all evidence indicates that
the contrary result was intended.7 If accepted, this argument would
Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 71 Sup. Ct. 416, 95 L. Ed. 417 (1951); Boske v. Comingore,
177 U.S. 459, 20 Sup. Ct. 701, 44 L. Ed. 846 (1900); Ex parte Sackett, 74 F.2d
922 (9th Cir. 1935). For a collection of the cases and a discussion thereof, see
4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1164-70 (2d ed. 1950). See also Note, 58 YALE L.J.
933 (1949). Rules 33 and 34 are available only as to parties. If the United
States were not a party, it would be necessary to use the deposition procedure
and, in order to obtain documents, a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 45 (d).
5. For example, the rule of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 Sup. Ct.
385, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947) applies. Many cases discuss its application in cases
involving the United States; e.g., Durkin v. Pet Milk Co., 14 F.R.D. 385, 391-94
(W.D. Ark. 1953); United States ex rel. TVA v. Bennett, 14 F.R.D. 166, 167
(E.D. Tenn. 1953); United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19, 21
(E.D.N.Y. 1952); United States v. Shubert, 11 F.R.D. 528, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1951);
United States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.D. 523, 527-28 (D. Minn. 1949); Henz v.
United States, 9 F.R.D. 291, 294-95 (N.D. Cal. 1949); Anglo-Saxon Petroleum
Co. v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 62, 63-64 (D. Mass. 1948).
6. United States v. General Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 528 (N.D. II. 1942).
For a discussion of the case, and the Government's arguments in it, see
O'Reilly, Discovery Against the United States: A New Aspect of Sovereign
Immunity?, 21 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1942).
7. See Rule 37(f) and the discussion of it in United States v. General
Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 528, 530 (N.D. IlM. 1942). But see O'Reilly, supra note
6, at 8. Statements made by members of the Advisory Committee make it clear
that discovery was intended to be available against the United States. For
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mean that to a large extent, the Federal Rules do not control actions
to which the United States is a party, so that as to most matters
no rules at all exist for such actions." Apparently the Government
has recognized the weakness of these arguments, since it has now
abandoned its position that it is not subject to the discovery rules.9
H. GovENMENTAL PRIVILEGES
The United States has not, however, abandoned its many claims
of privilege which it vigorously and frequently asserts. There is no
question but that a party is not entitled to discovery of matters which
are privileged O "Privileged" as used in this respect refers to evi-
dentiary privileges. Thus to the extent that an actual evidentiary
privilege exists, the Government's position must be sustained. The
special privileges which it claims fall into four general categories: (1)
the informer privilege; (2) military and state secrets privilege;
(3) specific statutory privileges; and (4) a general, all inclusive
"housekeeping" privilege.
A. Informer Privilege
There is a well-recognized common-law privilege which protects
the identity of an informer.' 2 Some courts, including the federal,
apply this privilege as well to the contents of his communication. 13
statements by Judge Clark and Mr. Mitchell that the rules were intended to
apply to the United States except as otherwise stated, see: ABA, PROCEED-
INGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT WASHINGTON AND SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY ON
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 50, 333 (1939). For statements by Pro-
fessor Sunderland and Mr. Mitchell that the discovery provisions specifically
apply, see id. at 266-67, 333.
8. "To hold that the rules do not apply to the United States except where
it is particularly mentioned would lead to absurd results. Then there would
be no rule in such cases as to many matters of procedure. Or does the Govern-
ment contend that as to matters covered by rules in which the United States
is not mentioned we should conform to state practice as under the old proce-
dure?" United States v. General Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 528, 530 (N.D. Ill.
1942).
9. Brief for Appellant, p. 56, United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 73 Sup.
Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed. 519 (1953).
10. "[T]he deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ... "
FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b). This rule applies to depositions; it is made applicable to
interrogatories by Rule 33 and to the production of documents by Rule 34.
Rule 34 as to the production of documents also requires a showing of good
cause by the movant.
11. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6, 73 Sup. Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed.
519 (1953).
12. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (3d ed. 1940); Sanford, Evidentiary Privi-
leges Against the Production of Data Within the Control of Executive Depart-
ments, 3 VAND. L. REV. 73, 75-78, 81 (1949). See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE,
Rule 230 (1942).
13. Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 4 Sup. Ct. 12, 28 L. Ed. 158 (1884); Arnstein
v. United States, 296 Fed. 946 (D.C. Cir. 1924). See In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532,
535-36, 15 Sup. Ct. 959, 39 L. Ed. 1080 (1895). Wigmore would limit the
privilege strictly to the identity of the informant. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §




Its rationale is that "such communications ought to receive encourage-
ment and because that confidence which will lead to such communi-
cations can be created only by holding out exemption from a com-
pulsory disclosure of the informant's identity.' '14 Although this privi-
lege is usually applied to persons who furnish information concerning
criminal prosecutions, it seems proper to apply it also to those who
furnish information concerning civil actions which are designed to
end public wrongs, when they give such information to a government
official who has the responsibility of enforcing the law.15 Thus it
has been applied, both to the identity of the informer and the contents
of his communication, in civil antitrust 16 and Fair Labor Standards
Act'7 cases.
The privilege is that of the Government and can be waived by
it by revealing the matter protected.'8 If the Government waives the
privilege, or intends to waive it at a trial, then there ordinarily would
seem to be no reason to respect it in pre-trial discovery proceedings.
Thus, it has been held that when the Government intends to reveal
the privileged information at the trial, it can be compelled to reveal
it through pre-trial discovery.0 This result seems correct.
20
14. 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (3d ed. 1940).
15. "The privilege applies to communications to such officers only as have
a responsibility or duty to investigate or to prevent public wrongs, and not
to officials in general. This ordinarily signifies the police, and officials of
criminal justice generally.
"But it may also include administrative officials having a duty of inspec-
tion or of law-enforcement in their particular spheres. The truth is that
the principle is a large and flexible one; it applies wherever the situation is
one where without this encouragement the citizens who have special infor-
mation of a violation of law might be deterred otherwise from voluntarily re-
porting it to the appropriate official." Ibid.
The Government has argued that the privilege should be extended to
statements made in the investigation of an airplane crash, since such wit-
nesses "might otherwise be reluctant to make statements to an investigating
board inculpating themselves or their colleagues." Brief for Appellant, p. 43,
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 73 Sup. Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed. 519 (1953).
Any such extension of the privilege is wholly unwarranted and would go
beyond the policy and theory of the privilege. It is particularly inappropriate
in this particular case, since the Government offered to produce these very
witnesses for the plaintiffs to examine.
16. United States v. Shubert, 11 F.R.D. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States
v. Lorain Journal Co., 10 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Ohio 1950); United States v. Sun
Oil Co., 10 F.R.D. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1950); United States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.D.
523 (D. Minn. 1949); United States v. Kohler Co., 9 F.R.D. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
17. Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 4 F.R.D. 265 (E.D.N.Y.
1943). Contra: Durkin v. Pet Milk Co., 14 F.R.D. 385 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
18. Sanford, supra note 12, at 76.
19. United States v. Shubert, 11 F.R.D. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See Walling
v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 4 F.R.D. 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1943). But cf. United
States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.D. 523 (D. MAnn. 1949). In United States v. Sun
Oil Co., 10 F.R.D. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1950), a case in which the court refused
discovery because of the informer privilege, the Government, before the
decision on this point, offered to make available to defendant, at such time
before trial as the court might direct, a complete list of Government witnesses
to be called at the trial.
20. It is conceivable that such disclosure would be inadvisable, e.g., it might
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B. Military and State Secrets
Although the cases involving it are few, there is no question that
there should be, and is, a privilege for military and state secrets.21
The exact nature of the subject matter covered by this privilege is
not clear. Wigmore states that it covers "acts of pending international
negotiations or military precautions against foreign enemies."2 2 There
should be no doubt, for instance, that it would currently apply to
atomic secrets.23 In cases involving discovery, it has been applied
to submarine plans, 24 to plans for devices which determine sighting
data for guns25 and to statements concerning the crash of a military
plane carrying secret electronic equipment.26
C. Special Statutory Privileges
There are also various privileges created by specific statutes. These
often protect information required by law to be reported to the
Government, or reports to be made by governmental officials.2 7 There
is a qualified privilege, for instance, for income tax returns.2 Rail-
road accident reports required to be made to the Interstate Commerce
Commission, as well as the reports of investigations made by the
interfere with obtaining additional information from the particular informant.
Such a remote possibility can be dealt with when it arises and should not
be the basis of a general rule denying disclosure in all cases.
21. 8 WIGMORE, EVDENCE §§ 2378, 2378a (3d ed. 1940); Sanford, supra note
12, at 74-75. See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 227 (1942).
22. 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2378a (3d ed. 1940). The MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE,
Rule 227 (1942), defines a secret of state as "information not open or thereto-
fore officially disclosed to the public concerning the military or naval organi-
zations or plans of the United States, or a State or Territory, or concerning
international relations."
23. It was indicated that the privilege applied to a Government contract
during World War II in connection with an atomic energy project. See Haugen
v. United States, 153 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1946) and United States v. Haugen,
58 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Wash. 1944). For a discussion of litigation involving
such secrets, and the problems it presents, see Note, 19 TENN. L. REV. 477
(1946). See also, Haydock, Some Evidentiary Problems Posed by Atomic
Energy Security Requirements, 61 HARv. L. REV. 468 (1948).
24. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., Ltd., [1942] A.C. 624. The privilege
was claimed here by the defendant which built the submarine and which
had possession of the documents.
25. Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1939). Here
again the privilege was successfully claimed by a corporate defendant which
manufactured the equipment for the Government. The court stated: "It is
as though the Government were manufacturing the alleged infringing devices
itself." Id. at 585.
26. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 73 Sup. Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed. 519
(1953). The court seems to have misapplied the privilege here. See discussion
of case below.
27. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2377 (3d ed. 1940); Sanford, supra note 12, at
82-86. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 228 (1942). Even in the absence of
a statute, a few cases apply a privilege to matters similar to those protected
by statute and to communications between public officials, but these cases
are not numerous enough or clear enough in their reasoning to create a
separate, independent privilege. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2367, 2378, 2378a
(3d ed. 1940); Sanford, supra note 12, at 78-81, But see MODEL CODE OF EVI-
DENCE, Rule 228 (1942).
28. IwT. REV. CODE § 55.
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Interstate Commerce Commission, are privileged.2 There is also a
privilege for reports of the Civil Aeronautics Board of investigations
of airplane accidents. 30 To the extent that such statutes create genuine
privileges, they must, of course, be respected in discovery proceedings.
D. General Housekeeping Privilege
When a request is made for information which the Government
does not wish to reveal but which does not come within the scope
of the relatively limited privileges discussed above, the Government
regularly asserts a general "housekeeping" privilege. It is broad
enough to cover all public business, all internal affairs of the Govern-
ment, all papers and all information in the Government's possession. In
practice no attempt is made to apply it so broadly;31 but it can be
made to cover any matter the executive does not want to disclose.
The claimed general privilege is usually based on R.S. § 161:
"The head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the government of his department, the conduct
of its officers and clerks, the distribution and performance of its business
and the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, and prop-
erty appertaining to it."32
Under this statute, the typical regulation provides that all documents
and information in the possession of the department are confidential
and shall be divulged only on authorization by the head of the
department.33
29. 36 STAT. 350, 351 (1910), 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 38, 40, 41 (1943).
30. 52 STAT. 1012 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. § 581 (1951). This statute does not
specifically cover reports made to the CAB, and it has been held not to cover
such reports. Tansey v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 97 F. Supp.
458 (D.D.C. 1949). Nor does it cover testimony given before the CAB in
the course of an accident investigation. Ritts v. American Overseas Airlines,
Inc., 97 F. Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
31. In a number of cases, presumably the Government has not argued privi-
lege, since the court has granted the discovery with no discussion of privilege.
United States v. 50.34 Acres of Land, 12 F.R.D. 440, 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y.
1952); United States v. 1278.83 Acres of Land, 12 F.R.D. 320 (E.D. Va. 1952);
Miehle v. United States, 11 F.R.D. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Societe Internationale
pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Clark, 9 F.R.D.
263 (D.D.C. 1949); United States v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., 8 F.R.D. 258
(N.D. Ohio 1948); United States v. 300 Cans of Black Raspberries, 7 F.R.D.
36 (N.D. Ohio 1946); United States v. American Solvents & Chemical Corp.
of California, 30 F. Supp. 107 (D. Del. 1939); Curtis v. United States, 27 F.
Supp. 459 (D. Mass. 1939); Galanos v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 298 (D.
Mass. 1939). And in many cases in which it claimed a privilege, the Govern-
ment has given some information without objection, e.g., United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 73 Sup. Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed. 519 (1953); United States v.
Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. La. 1949), af'd,
339 U.S. 940 (1950) (on appeal Court equally divided).
32. R.v. STAT. § 161 (1875), 5 U.S.C.A. § 22 (1927).
33. E.g., Department of Justice Order 3229, 11 FED. BRE.. 4920 (1946):
"All official files, documents, records and information in the offices of the
Department of Justice, including the several offices of United States Attorneys,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Marshals, and Federal penal
1954 ]
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As a general matter there is little or no justification for such a
general housekeeping privilege. The alleged basis for it is the "public
interest" in keeping governmental records confidential. But there is
seldom any analysis to determine why or whether there is a public
interest in such secrecy. Generally, the other privileges cover matters
which it is actually not in the public interest to disclose. Of course,
it would not be desirable to have the public at large make a general
practice of invading governmental offices every day to satisfy its
collective curiosity; unlimited access could be a substantial nuisance.
But such danger is slight when the access is limited to parties to
litigation with the United States, 34 especially since the judge can
thwart any attempts at abuse by using Rules 30 (b) and (d).35
On the other hand, there are valid reasons why there should not
be such a general privilege. We must assume, as certainly is true
in the great majority of cases, that a party seeks information by
discovery because it is important to his case, and not because of
some idle curiosity or desire to harass. The efficient administration
of justice requires that this information be made available to him,
unless there is an overriding conflicting interest. In no case has any
such conflicting interest been shown to exist in connection with this
claimed privilege. The desire of the Government to keep its many ac-
tivities secret does not justify denying or impeding justice in a
and correctional institutions, or in the custody or control of any officer or
employee of the Department of Justice, are to be regarded as confidential.
No officer or employee may permit the disclosure or use of the same for any
purpose other than for the performance of his official duties, except in the
discretion of the Attorney General, The Assistant to the Attorney General,
or an Assistant Attorney General acting for him.
'Whenever a subpoena duces tecum is served to produce any of such
files, documents, records or information, the officer or employee on whom
such subpoena is served, unless otherwise expressly directed by the Attorney
General, will appear in court in answer thereto and respectfully decline to
produce the records specified there in, on the ground that the disclosure of
such records is prohibited by this regulation."
34. For an example of how the discovery provisions can be abused, see
United States v. Bridges, 86 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
35. Rule 30(b) as to depositions authorizes the judge to limit the scope of
the examination and generally to make any "order which justice requires
to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppres-
sion." Rules 33 and 34 respectively make this provision applicable to inter-
rogatories and motions for production of documents. Rule 30 (d) also provides
that the court may limit the scope of, or the manner of taking, a deposition,
or may order the examination ended, "upon a showing that the examination
is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy,
embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party..."
It has been suggested that Rules 30 (b) and 30 (d) form a more valid basis
than privilege for protecting the Government from disclosure. Pike and
Fischer, Discovery Against Federal Administrative Agencies, 56 HAIv. L. REV.
1125, 1134-36 (1943). These provisions were intended to prevent abuses of
the discovery procedure, and not to prevent discovery within its legitimate
area because of some vague "public interest" in nondisclosure. The courts
have not used this provision for such a purpose, and apparently the Govern-




Of course, if a statute establishes such a privilege, it must be applied,
regardless of how erroneous the reason for it is. But nothing in
R.S. § 161 compels, or even justifies, finding a privilege for matters
purportedly made confidential by regulations under it. Nothing in
the statute refers to privilege. Its wording is entirely different from
that of statutes designed to create a privilege,3 7 and obviously is
intended merely to confer on the department head the authority
to supervise the day to day operation of his office.3 8 As to records,
papers, and property, such authority only goes so far as to authorize
him to make regulations as to their "custody, use, and preservation."
In context, this language obviously is just as limited as the rest of
the statute, and refers only to such matters of internal management
as deciding where and how to file and store records, appointing
someone to perform these functions, etc. It is an unwarranted
distortion of language to extend a statute concerned with routine
administration and not with court proceedings so as to create an
evidentiary privilege.
Another ground which has been advanced for not applying this
statute so as to create a privilege is that since it gives authority only
to prescribe regulations "not inconsistent with law," and since the
Federal Rules have the "force of a federal statute,' 39 the regulations
36. "In any community under a system of representative government
and removable officials, there can be no facts which require to be kept secret
with that solidity which defies even the inquiries of a court of justice....
Such a secrecy can seldom be legitimately desired. It is generally desired for
the purposes of partisan politics or personal self-interest or bureaucratic
routine. The responsibility of officials to explain and to justify their acts
is the chief safeguard against oppression and corruption .... To concede to
them a sacrosanct secrecy in a court of justice is to attribute to them a
character which for other purposes is never maintained,-a character which
appears to have been advanced only when it happens to have served some
undisclosed interest to obstruct investigation into facts which might reveal
a liability.
"It is urged, to be sure . . . that the 'public interest must be considered
paramount to the individual interest of a suitor in a court of justice.' As if
the public interest were not involved in the administration of justice! As if
the denial of justice to a single suitor were not as much a public injury as is
the disclosure of any official record! When justice is at stake, the appeal to
the necessities of the public interest on the other side is of no superior weight."
8 WIrmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2 378a (3d ed. 1940).
See also Street, State Secrets-A Comparative Study, 14 MOD. L. REV.
121 (1951). But see MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 228 (1942).
37. See statutes cited in notes 28, 29 and 30, supra, and note 100 infra. See
also Berger and Krash, Government Immunity from Discovery, 59 YALE L.J.
1451, 1461 (1950).
38. Wigmore states that such a statute or regulation thereunder is "usually
aimed simply at imposing upon the staff a proper silence in everyday inter-
course outside of the office and at defending the records from the intensive
scrutiny of the public having no interest therein." 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
2378a (3d ed. 1940). See also Note, 58 YALE L.J. 993, 996 (1949).
39. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072 (1950); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13, 61
Sup. Ct. 422, 85 L. Ed. 479 (1941).
1954 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
prohibiting discovery are rendered invalid as inconsistent with law.40
This argument appears erroneous. The Federal Rules specifically pro-
vide that discovery cannot be required of "privileged" matters,41
and if this statute or the regulations thereunder create a privilege,
there is no inconsistency, since then the Federal Rules do not require
production of the privileged matters.
The cases involving claims of this housekeeping privilege are so
completely confused that it is not possible to say whether or to
what extent such a privilege exists. A few cases have recognized
the existence of such a privilege, and have applied it to prevent
discovery. 42 More cases have rejected the claim of privilege, at least
as to the specific information requested. 3 Two cases have allowed
discovery of information by depositions or interrogatories, but have
indicated that documents in government files are privileged and
cannot be inspected or copied under Rule 34.44 In other cases the
courts have refused to sustain a blanket claim of privilege and
have ordered the discovery, but have given the Government a right
to raise the issue as to specific items. 45 In some instances, the court
has ordered that the documents be shown first to it, so that it can
decide whether or not they are privileged.46
40. See Berger & Kxash, supra note 37, at 1460-62.
41. See note 10 supra.
42. United States v. Shubert, 11 F.R.D. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Walling v.
Comet Carriers, Inc., 3 F.R.D. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). See Pacific-Atlantic S.S.
Co. v. United States, 175 F.2d 632, 636-37 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
868 (1949); United States v. Kohler Co., 9 F.R.D. 289, 291 (E.D. Pa. 1949). In
the Shubert case, the court sustained the claim of privilege, but said that
the same issue could be presented at trial by a subpoena duces tecum served
on the Attorney General (the documents sought were in the Department of
Justice files). The court said that "Then a clear cut ruling on the claim of
privilege may be obtained." United States v. Shubert, supra, at 538. This
statement would have validity when the United States was not a party. United
States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 71 Sup. Ct. 416, 95 L. Ed. 417
(1951). But it had none here. See note 59 infra.
43. Durkin v. Pet Milk Co., 14 F.R.D. 385 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Mandel v.
United States, 93 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 191
F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1951); Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 74 F. Supp. 933 (D.
Hawaii 1947); United States v. General Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 528 (N.D.
Ill. 1942). Accord, Bowles v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). Cf.
Royal Exchange Assur. v. McGrath, 13 F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Evans v.
United States, 10 F.R.D. 255 (W.D. La. 1950); Standard X-Ray Co. v. United
States, 3 FED. RULES Smv. 34.42, Case 2, at 393 (N.D. Ill. 1940) (opinion
ordered withdrawn, June 12, 1940).
44. See Brewer v. Hassett,. 2 F.R.D. 222, 223 (D. Mass. 1942); Fleming v.
Bernardi, 1 F.R.D. 624, 626 (N.D. Ohio 1941).
45. United States v. Weinblatt, 11 F.R.D. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); cf. O'Keefe
v. Shaughnessy, 95 F. Supp. 900 (N.D.N.Y. 1951). Such right is not expressly
stated in Evans v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 255 (W.D. La. 1950), but it seems
implicit in the opinion.
46. United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D.
La. 1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 940 (1950) (on appeal Court equally divided);
Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949). Cf. Royal Exchange
Assur. v. McGrath, 13 F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Henz v. United States. 9
F.R.D. 291 (N.D. Cal. 1949). See Evans v. United States, supra note 45. The
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Some courts have assumed or uncritically accepted the privilege
but have then found a waiver of it. Thus it has been held that the
United States waives its privilege when it brings an action.4 7 When
the United States is a defendant, it has been held that the consent
to be sued constitutes a waiver.48 And in a habeas corpus proceeding,
the ;court indicated that the act of detaining the petitioner was
sufficient to constitute a waiver.
49
This doctrine of waiver is obviously a fiction. 0 It is incorrect to
say that the United States or any other party waives an evi-
dentiary privilege by bringing a suit. Similarly, it is erroneous to
allow discovery, as some cases have, on the basis that the Federal
Tort Claims Act 51 or the Suits in Admiralty Act,52 puts the Govern-
ment in the same position as a private litigant 53 and therefore
constitutes something analogous to a waiver of a privilege which
might otherwise exist. It is true that when the United States brings
an action and when it is sued pursuant to its consent, it is on the same
terms as any other litigant;54 but other litigants obviously do not
waive their evidentiary privileges by suing or being sued, and thus
if the United States does, it is not in the same position as a private
litigant. Obviously, when the court finds a waiver, it is in effect holding
that there is no privilege. 55
same course was followed in Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D.
Pa. 1950), rev'd sub noma. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
47. Fleming v. Bernardi, 1 F.R.D. 624 (N.D. Ohio 1941); cf. Bowles v. Ack-
erman, 4 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
48. Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). This
case was settled without disclosure by the Government. Brief for Appellant,
p. 59, United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 339 U.S. 940,
70 Sup. Ct. 793, 94 L. Ed. 1356 (1950).
49. United States ex rel. Schlueter v. Watkins, 67 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y.
1946), aff'd on other grounds, 158 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1946).
50. 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1174-75 (2d ed. 1948). See United States
ex rel. Schlueter v. Watkins, supra note 49, at 561: "[T]he theory of waiver
upon which the requirement of disclosure has been based seems to me to be
the kind of useful fiction which the law invents to express an underlying
public policy."
51 "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this
title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as
a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for
interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1950).
52. "Such suits shall proceed and shall be heard and determined according
to the principles of law and to the rules of practice obtaining in like cases
between private parties." 41 STAT. 526 (1920), as amended, 49 STAT. 1987, 2016
(1936), 46 U.S.C.A. § 743 (1944).
53. Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949); Wunderly v.
United States, 8 F.R.D. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1948); O'Neill v. United States, 79 F.
Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1948), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alltnaont v. United
States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950).
54. Luckenbach Steamship Co. v. Norwegian Barque "Thekla," 266 U.S. 328,
45 Sup. Ct. 112, 69 L. Ed. 313 (1924); Daitz Flying Cor. v. United States, 4
F.R.D. 372 (E.D.N.Y. 1945). See Jones v. Watts, 142 F.2d 575, 577 (5th Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 787 (1944); United States v. Alexander, 47 F. Supp.
900, 907 (W.D. Va. 1942).
55. Although the court did not refer to waiver, a similar result was reached
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Although waiver is used to obtain a desirable result, it is un-
fortunate that the courts have resorted to such a fiction. Apparently
this approach developed as a method to distinguish certain cases
which upheld the validity of departmental regulations under R.S. §
161 and held that in an action between private litigants, a subordinate
Government official could not be compelled to produce documents
in his possession.56 The courts seized on the obvious difference that
the Government was a party in the one action and not the other,
and because of it, invented a waiver when the Government was a
party. The idea of waiver gained support from a line of cases in
the second circuit which hold that in a criminal case, the Government
cannot withhold from the defendant documents relevant to his
defense on the basis of privilege, and that the Government must
choose between producing the evidence and letting the offense go
unpunished.57
However, these cases between private litigants are properly dis-
tinguishable on the basis that the department head was not before
the court and that the orders to produce were directed at subordinate
officers. 58 The regulations under R.S. § 161 generally provide that
records can be produced only with the approval of the department
head, and to this extent, they are valid and controlling. When the
United States is a party, and the order is directed at it, it becomes
the duty of the department head as an employee of the United States
to produce the records.59 It would have been much simpler and more
logical to distinguish the cases between private litigants properly
on such basis, rather than to go through the circumlocution of waiving
a privilege which does not properly exist in the first place.
It has been suggested that discovery should be more liberally per-
mitted when the Government appears in a proprietary capacity (as
in a contract or tort action) than when it seeks to enforce the laws
in Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 915 (N.D.
Fla. 1952), where the court held that statements made in an investigation and
testimony before a Navy Court of Inquiry were privileged, but that they lost
such status if and when given to the Government attorneys in the case. Dis-
covery was allowed as to such documents, if any, given to Government counsel.
This result is a fair one, but does not appear sound, since a party should not
be held to waive a privilege by communicating the matter to his attorney;
an attorney-client relationship should be held to exist between attorneys in
the Department of Justice and the other agencies of the Government.
56. Cases cited note 4 supra.
57. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 920 (1952); United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir.
1948); United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir. 1946); United
States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944).
58. The limitation of the decisions in these cases to orders directed at a
subordinate official is emphasized by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring
opinion in United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 470, 71 Sup. Ct.
416, 95 L. Ed. 417 (1951).
59. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 992-93 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd on
other grounds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
[ VOL. 7
SCOPE OF DISCOVERY
(as in an antitrust action).60 Such a distinction is invalid. The test
of the existence of a privilege is not the nature of the action in which
it is claimed, but the nature of the information sought. The revelation
of a particular piece of information does no more harm in one type
of action than in another. Justice requires furnishing the information
in one type of case just as much as in the other. The United States
does not have other special rights or procedural advantages in en-
forcing the laws by a civil action, and there is no justification for
creating them in respect to discovery. Furthermore, the Federal Rules
do not make distinctions among types of actions, and any distinction
created, regardless of its merit or lack of merit logically, is an un-
authorized and unjustified judicial amendment to the Rules.
III. WHO DEcmES WHETHmR CERTAIN MATERIAL IS PRIVILEGED
Just as important as whether a privilege exists is the question of
whether the court or the executive decides whether particular in-
formation or documents come within whatever privileges there may
be, since if the executive makes the final decision, then all judicial
attempts at defining what privileges exist are, as a practical matter,
futile. Since the application of a privilege is a question of the ad-
missibility of evidence,61 it is usually unquestioned that at a trial
the judge determines whether a privilege exists.62 Exactly the same
type of determination is involved in deciding what is privileged under
the discovery rules. There is no reason for departing from the rule
in the application of a governmental privilege in either case, since
this is as much a judicial question as is the application of any other
privilege.
63
However, in England, in the leading case of Duncan v. Cammell,
Laird & Co., Ltd.,64 it was held that the determination by an adminis-
trative official that a certain matter is privileged is conclusive and
60. Pike and Fischer, supra note 35, at 1128-29. See 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 1180 (2d ed. 1948). See United States v. Kohler Co., 9 F.R.D. 289, 290
(E.D. Pa. 1949).
61. See 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1175-79 (2d ed. 1948).
62. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2212, 2322, 2379 (3d ed. 1940); 9 id. § 2550.
63. "The truth cannot be escaped that a Court which abdicates its inherent
function of determining the facts upon which the admissibility of evidence
depends will furnish to bureaucratic officials too ample opportunities for
abusing the privilege. The lawful limits of the privilege are extensible beyond
any control, if its applicability is left to the determination of the very official
whose interest it may be to shield a wrongdoing under the privilege. Both
principle and policy demand that the determination of the privilege shall
be for the Court . . . " 8 id. § 2379.
64. [19421 A.C. 624. For discussions of the case, pro and con, see Note, 56
HARV. L. REV. 806, 813-14 (1943); 59 L.Q.REV. 102 (1943); 21 CAN. B. REV. 51
(1943); 58 L.Q.REv. 436 (1942); 20 CAN. B. REV. 805 (1942). For a critical dis-
cussion of this and other recent English cases, and a comparison of them with
American cases, see Street, supra note 36.
1954]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
binds the court. In an action between private litigants,05 in which
plaintiffs were seeking to recover damages for deaths caused by the
sinking of the submarine Thetis which was built by defendants, the
House of Lords refused to compel production of certain documents,00
after the Admiralty had directed defendants not to produce the
documents "on the ground of Crown privilege."67 The basis for the
decision was a belief that the executive is better qualified and situated
to protect the public interest in reaching a decision on such a ques-
tion.68
. There does not appear to be any doubt that these documents did
involve military secrets and that the result was correct, since whoever
decided the question would have to conclude that they were privileged.
However, the opinion makes it clear that a court will not compel
any government official to reveal documents if he concludes that it
is in the public interest not to do so. It is true that the precise holding
is that the final decision as to privilege is for the judge, and that he
is bound by an administrative decision when properly made.0 9 Thus
it might be argued that the court in some instance might review such
a decision.70 But no hint is given of when a reversal of the adminis-
trative decision would be proper. And although the opinion does set
forth the standards the administrative official should apply,71 there
65. At this time the Government was not subject to discovery in England:
"When the Crown . . . is a party to a suit, it cannot be required to give
discovery of documents at all. No special ground of objection is needed. The
common law principle is well established . . ." Duncan v. Cammell, Laird
& Co., Ltd., [1942] A.C. 624, 632. This rule has now been changed by statute.
See note 72 infra.
66. Demanded were the contract for the hull and machinery of the Thetis,
letters written before the sinking as to its trim, reports of its condition when
raised, plans and specifications for it, and the notebook of a foreman painter
employed by defendants. Id. at 627.
67. In spite of this holding, plaintiffs were able to prove the facts involved,
but eventually it was held that none of the defendants was liable for negli-
gence. Woods v. Duncan, [1946] A.C. 401.
68. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., Ltd., [1942] A.C. 624, 639-41.
69. "Although an objection validly taken to production, on the ground that
this would be injurious to the public interest, is conclusive, it is important to
remember that the decision ruling out such documents is the decision of
the judge. Thus, in the present case, the objection raised in the respondents'
affidavit is properly expressed to be an objection to produce 'except under
the order of this honourable court.' It is the judge who is in control of the
trial, not the executive, but the proper ruling for the judge to give is as
above expressed." Id. at 642.
70. See Street, supra note 36, at 123.
71.' "It is not a sufficient ground that the documents are 'State documents'
or 'official', or are marked 'confidential.' It would not be a good ground that,
if they were produced the consequences might involve the department or the
government in parliamentary discussion or in public criticism, or might
necessitate the attendance as witnesses or otherwise of officials who have
pressing duties elsewhere. Neither would it be a good ground that production
might tend to expose a want of efficiency in the administration or tend to lay
the department open to claim for compensation. In a word, it is not enough
that the minister of the department does not want to have the documents
produced. The minister, in deciding whether it is his duty to object, should
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is no indication of an inclination on the part of the court to force
these standards on him. In any event, the principle of administrative
finality seems well-established and the holding of the case has now
been enacted by statute as to cases to which the Crown is a party. 2
In the cases in the United States, the Government has made, broadly
speaking, three principal arguments to support its position that the
executive's decision is final:73 (1) the constitutional independence of
the executive, and separation of powers; (2) policy considerations,
largely based on the idea that the executive is better qualified to weigh
the public interest; (3) the statute, R.S. § 161, concerning custody of
Government documents."4
It appears erroneous to argue that this is a constitutional issue.
The judiciary is not attempting to impinge on the executive function,
since the only question is the admissibility of evidence, a question
purely judicial in nature. The point does not involve the day-to-day
administration of the Government, since it arises only when the
Government is in court, either because it has seen fit to bring an action
or because it has been made a defendant pursuant to its own consent.
bear these considerations in mind, for he ought not to take the responsibility
of withholding production except in cases where the public interest would
otherwise be damnifled, for example, when disclosure would be injurious to
national defence or, to good diplomatic relations, or where the practice of
keeping a class of documents secret is necessary for the proper functioning
of the public service." Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., Ltd., [1942] A.C.
624, 642.
72. "(1) Subject to and in accordance with rules of court and county court
rules:-
(a) in any civil proceedings in the High Court or a county court to which
the Crown is a party, the Crown may be required by the court to make dis-
covery of documents and produce documents for inspection; and
(b) in any such proceedings as aforesaid, the Crown may be required
by the court to answer interrogatories.
Provided that this section shall be without prejudice to any rule of law
which authorizes or requires the withholding of any document or the refusal
to answer any question on the ground that the disclosure of the document
or the answering of the question would be injurious to the public interest....
"(2) Without prejudice to the proviso to the preceding subsection, any
rules made for the purposes of this section shall be such as to secure that
the existence of a document will not be disclosed if, in the opinion of a
Minister of the Crown, it would be injurious to the public interest to disclose
the existence thereof." Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, 10 & 11 GEo. VI, c.
44, § 28.
It has been said in regard to this statute: "This has a marked tendency
toward bureaucratic oppression, yet, in fairness, it must be admitted that
none of the experienced members of the judiciary who spoke on the matter
in the House of Lords on the passage of the bill thought that judges were
competent to decide this matter." Street, Tort Liability of the State: The
Federal Tort Claims Act and the Crown Proceedings Act, 47 MicE. L. REV.
341, 359-60 (1949).
73. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant, pp. 16, 20-47, United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1, 73 Sup. Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed. 727 (1953); Brief for Appellant, pp. 31-57,
United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 339 U.S. 940, 70 Sup.
Ct. 793, 94 L. Ed. 1356 (1950).
74. As to the Court of Claims, another statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2507 (1950),
is applicable; see note 100 infra.
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In all other respects, when the Government uses the courts, it must
submit to the rules of procedure and practice of those courts. r There
is no reason why it should not be compelled to do so when discovery
is involved.7
6
A court has full power to control proceedings before it, and there
is no basis to say that the enforcement of this judicial power is an
infringement on the rights of the executive, at least so long as there
is no discrimination against it. In enforcing such judicial power, the
question of whether the executive is subject to judicial process need
not arise; the court can impose sanctions in the pending suit under
Rule 37.77 If separation of powers has any relevance to the question,
it should prevent the executive from exercising the judicial function
of determining what is privileged under the law of evidence.
78
The Government has relied on several historical precedents as
supporting the constitutional argument,79 but none of them is con-
trolling. The refusal of the President to disclose information to Con-
gress in the course of the struggle of the executive branch to assert
its independence has nothing to do with the power of the courts to
impose sanctions in proceedings before them. Marbury v. Madison
and the Burr trial are cited as recognizing the independence of the
executive in respect to the courts, but these cases are open to con-
flicting interpretations and have little significance.8 0
75. See note 54 supra.
76. See Berger & Krash, supra note 37, at 1454-56.
77. Thus when the Government refused to produce documents in United
States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. La. 1949),
aff'd, 339 U.S. 940 (1950), an action instituted by the Government, the court
dismissed the action; and in Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa.
1950), rev'd sub. nom. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), where
the action was against the United States, the court took the facts on the
issue of negligence, which the documents sought involved, as established
against the Government.
78. "Neither the executive nor the legislative branch of the Government
may constitutionally encroach upon the field which the Constitution has
reserved for the judiciary by transferring to itself the power to decide
justiciable questions which arise in cases or controversies submitted to the
judicial branch for decision." Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997
(3d Cir. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). See also 3 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1176 (2d ed. 1948).
79. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (U.S. 1803); United
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30, 187, No. 14,692d, 14,694 (C.C.D. Va. 1807). See
Wolkinson, Demands of Congressional Committees for Executive Papers, Part
II, 10 FED. B.J. 223 (1949). See also precedents where the executive success-
fully fought congressional attempts to obtain information, discussed in Brief
for Appellant, pp. 36-39, United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Commit-
tee, 339 U.S. 940, 70 Sup. Ct. 793, 94 L. Ed. 1356 (1950); Brief for Appellant,
pp. 23-30, United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 73 Sup. Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed.
519 (1953), and in Wolkinson, Demands of Congressional Committees for
Executive Papers, Part I, 10 FED. B.J. 103 (1949).
80. Compare Brief for Appellant, pp. 39-40, United States v. Cotton Valley
Operators Committee, supra note 79, Brief for Appellant, pp. 31-33, United
States v. Reynolds, supra note 79, and Wolkinson, Demands of Congressional
Committees for Executive Papers, Part II, 10 FED. B.J. 223 (1949), with
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The argument that only the executive can adequately consider
and weigh the public interest shows a natural tendency of the
executive to overestimate his own expertness and to underestimate
that of the judge. The executive is on one side of an adversary pro-
ceeding and may be unconsciously influenced by this fact. Further-
more, his closeness to the public problems involved is likely to make
him overemphasize the general importance of the matter and the
need for secrecy, while underestimating its importance in the indi-
vidual's case.8 ' And the executive may be too busy with other matters
to give the problem the consideration due it.8 2 The judge, on the other
hand, has no such preconceived bias, and weighing such conflicting
interests is his normal function. If the executive is permitted to pre-
sent his arguments for secrecy to the judge, the judge is an adequate
and competent arbitrator of the conflicting interests involved.8 3
The argument for administrative finality based on R.S. § 161
has validity only if that statute be held to create a privilege or to
authorize a department head to create a privilege. If he can create
a privilege by saying that a certain matter is confidental, all the court
can properly do in deciding the application of that privilege is to
determine whether or not he has in fact so acted as to the particular
matter involved. For the reasons stated above, this statute should
be held not to create any privilege, and not to authorize anyone to
create a privilege. Consequently, it should be held not to have any-
thing to do with deciding the judicial question of whether a recog-
nized privilege applies.
The question of who applies the privilege was first presented to
the Supreme Court in United States v. Cotton Valley Operators
Committee.4 Here, in a civil antitrust action, in response to interrog-
atories under Rule 33 and a motion under Rule 34 to compel pro-
duction of documents, the Government gave some answers and sub-
mitted certain documents, but it refused to produce FBI reports, with
exhibits thereto, and communications concerning the case received by
the Department of Justice, and replies thereto.8 5 The trial court
Berger & Krash, supra note 37, at 1456-60, and 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2378,
2378a (3d ed. 1940).
81. See Street, State Secrets-A Comparative Study, 14 MOD. L. REv. 121
(1951); Comment, 18 U. OF CHL L. REV. 122, 126-27 (1950).
82. See 8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 23 78 a (3d ed. 1940).
83. But see 21 CAN. B. REV. 51 (1943). For a suggestion of having a special
tribunal to decide such questions of privilege, see Sanford, supra note 12.
84. 339 U.S. 940, 70 Sup. Ct. 793, 94 L. Ed. 1356 (1950).
85. The Government offered to supply in place of the FBI reports, verbatim
copies of statements by the agents of every interview which they had had,
omitting only (1) "technical procedure matters," such as an analysis of a
memo from an attorney outlining information to be sought; (2) referrals of
leads to other agents; (3) opinions on the merits of the case volunteered
by an accountant-agent. The Government attorney even offered to let the
court compare the abstract with the original to determine whether the
abstract was correct. He stated that in doing this, the Attorney General
1954 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
ordered the documents produced for his own inspection, stating
that he would then decide any claim of privilege. When this order
was not obeyed, he dismissed the action.8 The Supreme Court divided
evenly, 4-4,87 and thus affirmed the district court, but left the
question open.
The same question was presented to the Supreme Court again in
Reynolds v. United States.8  The Court asserted the right of the judge
to decide a question of privilege, but did not answer all questions
arising in this connection. The action was brought under the Tort
Claims Act to recover damages for the deaths in the crash of an Air
Force plane of civilian passengers who were on the plane in order
to test secret electronic equipment. There was no indication, however,
that this equipment caused or contributed to the accident.89
Plaintiff sought under Rule 34 to require the production of written
statements of three soldiers who survived the crash, and the report
and findings of the Air Force's official investigation. The Government
would not produce these documents.90 Originally, it claimed only a
general housekeeping privilege. The trial -_ourt denied the existence
of such a privilege, and granted plaintiff's motion to produce.9 1 Sub-
sequently, the Secretary of the Air Force wrote the district judge
that he had determined that it would not be in the public interest
to furnish the report. The court held an additional hearing, at which
the Secretary submitted a formal claim of privilege, setting forth his
right to promulgate regulations under R.S. § 161 and describing the
regulations, and stating for the first time that since the plane was
on a confidential mission and carried confidential equipment, any
disclosure of its mission or operation or performance would be "pre-
judicial to this Department and would not be in the public interest."
At the same time, the Government offered to make available the
three witnesses for interrogation by plaintiffs, guaranteeing "to
authorize them to testify to all matters pertaining to the cause of
the accident except as to 'classified' material."
The trial court then amended its order so as to require the Govern-
ment to produce the documents for examination by the court so that
waived his privilege but wanted to keep instructions within the Department
confidential.
86. United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D.
La. 1949).
87. Justice Clark did not participate in the case.
88. 345 U.S. 1, 73 Sup. Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed. 727 (1953).
89. "There is nothing to suggest that the electronic equipment, in this
case, had any causal connection with the accident." Id. at 11.
90. The only information given as to the cause of the crash was in answer
to an interrogatory stating, "Describe in detail the trouble experienced."
The answer the Government gave was, "At between 18,500 or 19,000 feet
manifold pressure dropped to 23 inches on No. one engine." Brauner V.
United States, 10 F.R.D. 468, 471 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
91. Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
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it could determine whether disclosure "would violate the Govern-
ment's privilege against disclosure of matters involving the national
or public interest." The Government did not comply with this order,
and the trial court took the facts as to the issue of negligence as
established against the defendant. The court of appeals affirmed this
judgment 2 To answer the argument based on R.S. § 161, it relied
heavily on the Tort Claims Act,93 and, without admitting that such a
right otherwise existed, said that this statute took away from the
executive departments in tort claims cases the right to determine
the extent of the privilege against disclosure of Government docu-
ments.9 4 As for the claim of a military secrets privilege, it stated
that the determination of whether such a recognized privilege applied
to certain documents was a judicial function,9 5 and that the district
court's order, requiring submission of the documents to the court,
adequately protected any privilege which existed.9 6
This decision was reversed by the Supreme Court.9 7 In the Supreme
Court, the Government vigorously argued that the constitutional in-
dependence of the executive, as recognized by R.S. § 161, gave the
right to refuse disclosure.9 s It made only passing reference to the
claim of privilege for military or state secrets.9 9 But the Court evaded
the main issue argued and decided the case on the basis that the
Government had presented a valid claim of privilege for military
secrets. It did not decide what general housekeeping privilege, if any,
exists. The Court clearly stated that the judge must decide the ap-
plication of a privilege:
"Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the
caprice of executive officers."'100
92. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951).
93. For the text of the section involved, see note 51 supra.
94. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 993 (3d Cir. 1951).
95. "[W]e are satisfied that a claim of privilege against disclosing evidence
relevant to the issues in a pending lawsuit involves a justiciable question, tra-
ditionally within the competence of the courts, which is to be determined
in accordance with the appropriate rules of evidence, upon the submission of
the documents in question to the judge for his examination in camera." Id.
at 997.
96. Id. at 996.
97. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 73 Sup. Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed. 727
(1953). Justices Black, Frankfurter and Jackson dissented, "substantially for
the reasons" stated by the court of appeals.
98. Brief for Appellant, pp. 21-35, United States v. Reynolds, supra note 97.
99. Id. at pp. 42-43.
100. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10, 73 Sup. Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed.
727 (1953). Prior lower court decisions had reached the same result. Crosby
v. Pacific S.S. Lines, Ltd., 133 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
752 (1943); Evans v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 255 (W.D. La. 1950); Zimmer-
man v. Poindexter, 74 F. Supp. 933 (D. Hawaii 1947). See Bank Line, Ltd.
v. United States, 163 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1947) (concurring opinion).
A different rule, however, is applicable to the Court of Claims. By 28
U.S.C.A. § 2507 (1950), the Court of Claims is given the power to call on any
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However, it did not hold that when the military secret privilege
is involved, complete disclosure to the judge must always be made.
Rather, it held that this privilege is analogous to the privilege against
self-incrimination so that the rule for the two should be the same:
"[Tihe court must be satisfied from all the evidence and circumstances,
and 'from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is
asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of
why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious dis-
closure could result.' Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-487
(1951). If the court is so satisfied, the claim of the privilege will be
accepted without requiring further disclosure."'01
The Court stated that there was a "reasonable danger" that the
accident report referred to the secret electronic equipment, although
the Court also stated that there was nothing to suggest that such
equipment had any causal connection with the accident.102
The only reason suggested why this privilege is similiar to the one
against self-incrimination, and not like the numerous other privileges
where the matter must be disclosed to the judge,10 3 is that the court
should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to
protect by insisting on examining the evidence. 01 But this objection
to disclosure applies to any privilege. Furthermore, this statement
shows too little faith in the ability and loyalty of judges. In some
instances it should not be necessary to disclose the information to
show that a privilege exists. For instance, if an interrogatory sought
a description of the process by which the hydrogen bomb is made, it
should not be necessary to present this information to the judge in
order for him to decide that the privilege applies. But where there
is doubt as to the privilege, there is no valid reason for not requiring
disclosure to the judge.
The rule stated, however, is a workable one, at least as to this
military and state secrets privilege, and if properly applied, could
produce fair results. Unfortunately, the Court went further and
beclouded the issue by saying that in investigating to see whether
a privilege should exist, the court must consider the degree of
necessity:
department or agency for "any information or papers it deems necessary," but
the section provides: "The head of any department or agency may refuse
to comply when, in his opinion, compliance will be injurious to the public
interest." The court has indicated that the department head's discretion is
a legal one, and not an arbitrary one which can be exercised without some
just or legal reason, and that if he refuses without just reason, the court
may admit secondary evidence. See Pollen v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 673, 678
(1937); Robinson v. United States, 50 Ct. Cl. 159, 165-66 (1915).
101. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9, 73 Sup. Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed.
727 (1953). See also 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2271 (3d ed. 1940).
102. United States v. Reynolds, supra note 101, at 10, 11.
103. See note 62 supra.
104. United States v. Reynolds, supra note 101, at 10.
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"In each case, the showing of necessity which is made will determine
how far the court should probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for
invoking the privilege is appropriate. Where there is a strong showing
of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted, but
even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privi-
lege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake.
A fortiori, where necessity is dubious, a formal claim of privilege, made
under the circumstances of this case, will have to prevail."'0 5
Any such qualification is undesirable. Necessity should not be a factor
in this determination. The judge cannot always make an intelligent
decision as to whether a certain item of information is necessary until
he knows what that information is. The result should depend only
on how clear it is that a military secret is involved. Although neces-
sity may result in a court's not applying a privilege,10 6 necessity
should not control how hard the court looks to find the privilege. The
court may have been confusing privilege with the showing of "good
cause" which is required by Rule 34. The discussion of necessity,
of course, is relevant in this respect, and it may be that the court
meant only that good cause was not shown here. This interpretation
of the case, however, appears erroneous, since it would mean that
the holding does not apply to depositions and interrogatories, for
which a showing of good cause is not required. 10 7 The principles of
the case should, and apparently were intended to, apply to all methods
of discovery.
Even granting that necessity should be a factor, the application
of the stated rule to this particular case appears erroneous. The
principal argument of the Government as to the reason for the
privilege was that revealing such information would interfere with
investigating airplane crashes. 08 The only military secrets alleged
to be involved related to the electronic equipment, and there was no
indication that this equipment had anything to do with the crash. 0 9
For this reason, the documents probably did not refer to this equip-
ment. Even if they did, the judge could have permitted the deletion
of the material, if any, relating to the secret equipment." 0 Plaintiffs
probably would still have obtained all the information they sought as
105. Id. at 11.
106. "Even when the privilege is strictly applicable, the trial court may
compel disclosure [of the identity of an informerl, if it appears necessary in
order to avoid the risk of false testimony or to secure useful testimony." 8
WMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (3d ed. 1940). See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE,
Rule 230 (1942).
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 26, 30, 31, 33.
108. Brief for Appellant, pp. 43-47, United States v. Reynolds, supra note 101.
109. See note 89 supra.
110. For a similar solution, see Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, 76 F.
Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), where the court ordered the Government to produce
the record of a Court of Naval Inquiry, except for the portions thereof dealing
solely with disciplinary action.
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to the crash. Instead of approving any such limited order, the Court
jumped at the Government's offer to make the witnesses available,
assumed that because of such offer there was no necessity and denied
any access to the documents. For reasons stated by the trial court,
this was not a satisfactory substitute. l' This offer to produce the
witnesses might just as logically be interpreted to show the importance
to the case of particular statements in the original report which the
Government wanted to avoid producing. If there was no military
secret or if it could have been deleted, and the Government resisted
only because the documents would have been harmful to its case,
plaintiffs should have been allowed discovery.
IV. CONCLUSION
It appears clear that discovery should be, and is, available against
the United States. The only limitations peculiar to the Government
should be based on its established privileges discussed above. If it
is desirable to make certain additional information or documents
confidential and unavailable in court, Congress should act to do so,
as it has as to some matters. The courts should not assume this task
by creating a privilege. The cases are too confused for it to be
possible to say whether or to what extent a general housekeeping
privilege exists. However, it is significant that in most cases presenting
the issue, the courts have allowed discovery for one reason or another.
It is illogical to talk of the existence of any such privilege and then
find a waiver of it when the Government brings an action itself or
is made a defendant, for the very purpose of a privilege is to protect
certain matters in a law suit.
In order to make the discovery procedure and the judicial process
effective, the judge must decide when a privilege applies. Courts are
surrendering a judicial function when they accept as final a determina-
tion by an administrative official. No provision of the Constitution or
any statute or other rule of law requires that this be done. The court
should always make an inquiry sufficient to determine whether a
privilege applies; the nature and extent of such inquiry should depend
on the nature of the information sought, and not on its necessity or
importance in the particular case, since whether the privilege should
apply depends on the nature of the information claimed to be
privileged.
111. Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468, 471 (E.D. Pa. 1950). This, of
course, offered a substitute only for the prior statements of the witnesses and
no substitute for the accident report.
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